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"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.
"I don't much care where-" said Alice.
"Then it doesn't much matter which way you walk," said the Cat.
"-so long as I get somewhere," Alice added as an explanation.1
The Lion thought it might be as well to frighten the Wizard, so he gave
a large, loud roar, which was so fierce and dreadful that Toto jumped
away from him in alarm and tipped over the screen that stood in a
comer. As it fell with a crash they looked that way, and the next
moment all of them were filled with wonder. For they saw, standing in
just the spot the screen had hidden, a little old man, with a bald head
and a wrinkled face, who seemed to be as much surprised as they were.
The Tin Woodman, raising his axe, rushed toward the little man and
cried out, "Who are you?"
"I am Oz, the Great and Terrible," said the little man, in a trembling
voice.
1. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 89 (The MacMillan Company
1898) (1865).
2. L. FRANK BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ 156 (George M. Hill Co. 1900).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Dorothy Gale's fictional adventures in the Land of Oz may seem to
have little bearing on the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the topic
of patentable subject matter, most recently given voice in Alice Corp.
Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International.3 Just as another Alice wondered
why a raven was like a writing desk, the reader may wonder what
fictional flights of fancy have to do with the sober functions of patent
laws. This Article, however, argues that the Supreme Court's recent
patent-eligibility jurisprudence marks a clear decision of the high court
that 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("Section 101") must serve as a bulwark against the
preemption of future innovation and that patent eligibility cannot turn on
the "draftsman's art," i.e., magic words that can generate patent
eligibility where it otherwise would not be present. Given its own choice
of directions, the Supreme Court has chosen to read Section 101 as
playing a strong, vital, quasi-jurisdictional role. In the movie version of
The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, the Wizard warns Dorothy to pay no
attention to the man behind the curtain.4 According to the Supreme
Court's contrariwise thinking, in the world of Alice, Section 101 can and
should be used early in litigation to distinguish a genuine, patentable
invention from a sham-that is, to expose to scrutiny the idea behind the
curtain.
II. ALICE'S ORIGINS
It is no secret that relations between the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have grown somewhat strained
in recent years. As recently as 2010, the Supreme Court appeared to
share the Federal Circuit's uncertainty about how Section 101 should
and might be used to deal with the proliferation of business method and
software patents without stifling innovation. In Bilski v. Kappos,5 Justice
Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority in a fractured set of opinions,
noted that the Federal Circuit's en banc consideration of the case had
generated "five different opinions.",6 Far from decrying this state of
affairs, Justice Kennedy wrote that "[s]tudents of patent law would be
well advised to study these scholarly opinions."7 Despite universal
agreement that the patent-at-issue was not subject-matter eligible, the
3. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (U.S. 2014).
4. THE WIZARD OF Oz (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
5. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
6. Id. at 600.
7. Id.
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Supreme Court split over whether Section 101 was "only a threshold
test,' 8 or "impose[d] a threshold condition."9 Was Section 101 a speed
bump on the path to patentability? Or was it a checkpoint at a closely-
guarded border crossing?
By 2014, the Supreme Court appeared to have grown weary of the
Federal Circuit's scholarly opinions. In Limelight Networks, Inc. v.
Akamai Technologies, Inc., Justice Samuel Alito, writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court, made the following blunt and striking
statement: "The Federal Circuit's analysis fundamentally
misunderstands what it means to infringe a method patent."'0 The rebuke
was plain. A now-unanimous Supreme Court was telling a still-
splintered Federal Circuit that it had made a fundamental error in its
understanding of the basics of a subject matter over which it has
exclusive jurisdiction.
For present purposes, we can ignore the ins and outs of induced
infringement, the doctrinal issue addressed in Limelight. Our focus is on
the structure of the Supreme Court's directive to the Federal Circuit. In
broad strokes, the Supreme Court instructed the Federal Circuit to
behave less like scholars and more like judges-that is, to apply the law
in its current form, not to bend it to new purposes. Under Supreme Court
authority, Justice Alito wrote, a method claim cannot be infringed unless
all of its steps are performed."1 Under Federal Circuit authority, he
continued, infringement of a method claim cannot occur unless there is
some defendant actually performing all of those steps or directing or
controlling those who do.12 That is, there can be no infringement without
a (single) infringer. Unless and until the Federal Circuit or the Supreme
Court overturns Muniauction Inc. v. Thomson Corp., the Federal Circuit
must apply it. It cannot, the Supreme Court suggested, perform an end-
run around its own case law to achieve a policy goal, whether that goal
is laudable or laughable.
Shortly after Limelight, the Supreme Court decided Alice, the fourth
in the recent quartet of Section 101 cases that began with Bilski. Two
years previous, in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc.,13 a unanimous Supreme Court had "set forth a
framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
8. Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 621 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
10. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (U.S. 2014).
11. Id.
12. Id. (citing Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
13. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (U.S. 2012).
2015]
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phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts."'4 Under that framework, a court
confronted with a Section 101 challenge to the claims of an asserted
patent begins by determining whether the claims at issue are directed to
one of those patent-ineligible concepts.'5 If so, then the court must ask
whether elements of each claim, both individually and as an ordered
combination, transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible
application. 6
In Mayo, not only did the Supreme Court announce this test, it
explained what his test was to accomplish, the reason why Section 101
matters, and why it matters differently from other provisions of Title 35
of the United States Code.17 The patent laws exist to promote innovation
and discovery. But for the monopoly power of a patent to perform that
public good, it cannot be allowed "to inhibit further discovery by
improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature."
' ' 8
[T]here is a danger that the grant of patents that tie up their use will
inhibit future innovation premised upon them, a danger that becomes
acute when a patented process amounts to no more than an instruction
to "apply the natural law," or otherwise forecloses more future
invention than the underlying discovery could reasonably justify.'
9
Thereafter, in its 2013 opinion in Ass 'n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., the Supreme Court reaffirmed the existence of
three long-standing limitations on patent-eligible subject matter: "We
have long held that [Section 101] contains an important implicit
exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.20
This paved the way for application of the Mayo test in Alice, a
unanimous opinion confirming that the two-step test, applied in Mayo to
a patent claiming a law of nature, applies equally to patents claiming
abstract ideas.2 1 Under Alice, a court looks at a patent's claims to see if
14. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (U.S. 2014).
15. Id. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296-97).
16. Id. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297).
17. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 ("declin[ing] the Government's invitation to substitute [35
U.S.C.] §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better established inquiry under § 101").
18. Id. at 1301.
19. Id. (citations omitted).
20. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (U.S.
2013).
21. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. In a separate concurrence, Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and
Breyer stake out the position that business methods should be declared categorically patent-
ineligible. Id. at 2360-61.
4
Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 9 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol9/iss1/2
ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN OZ
they claim an abstract idea.2 If it does, it then examines the elements of
the claims to see if they contain a sufficient inventive concept to
transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.
2 3
Importantly, the Alice opinion identifies several ways in which a patent
applicant cannot achieve this goal: by describing the abstract idea as
implemented on a general purpose computer; by adding token, post-
solution components to the abstract idea; or by narrowing the abstract
24idea to a particular field of use.
III. INTRODUCING ALICE
In the clear pronouncements in Mayo and Alice of a two-part test
for subject-matter eligibility there is a turn away from the fractured
holding of Bilski, which offered no test at all. In affirming the
ineligibility of a patent that most agreed was dead on arrival, the Court
in Bilski rejected as too rigid the Federal Circuit's machine-or-
transformation test. The Court held that, although the test offered "a
useful and important clue" and "an investigative tool," no one test could
embody a single scale on which patent eligibility could be weighed.
Instead of "adopting categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and
unforeseen impacts, the Court resolve[d]" Bilski on the narrower ground
"that petitioners' claims are not patentable processes because they are
attempts to patent abstract ideas.26
What changed between Bilski and Alice? Struggling in the wake of
Bilski to create a non-abstract way to measure abstractness, the Federal
Circuit (and patent litigators) divided into two camps. In one camp, self-
proclaimed pragmatists argued the best way to deal with Section 101
was not to deal with Section 101, suggesting that it should be the
doctrine of last resort once other (clearer) doctrines of invalidity had
been applied2 7 We have elsewhere referred to this viewpoint as the
22. Id at 2355.
23. Id. at 2357.
24. Id. at 2357-59.
25. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010).
26. Id. at 609.
27. See MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Plager, J.);
DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Plager, J., dissenting) ("I believe
that this court should exercise its inherent power to control the processes of litigation, and insist that
litigants, and trial courts, initially address patent invalidity issues in infringement suits in terms of
the defense provided in the statute: 'conditions of patentability,' specifically §§ 102 and 103, and in
addition §§ 112 and 251, and not foray into the jurisprudential morass of § 101 unless absolutely
necessary.") (citation omitted); see also Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently
Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1674
2015]
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"functional view.28
In the other camp fell those who concluded that, as a matter of court
precedent and chronology, Section 101 poses "an 'antecedent question'
that must be addressed before this court [the Federal Circuit] can
consider whether particular claims are invalid as obvious or
anticipated.,29 Since the Supreme Court in Bilski described Section 101
as a "threshold test,"30 a court has no choice but to apply Section 101
before considering any other potential flaws in a claimed invention. We
have elsewhere referred to this viewpoint as the "jurisdictional view."
31
Welcome or not, in Section 101 lies an opportunity for a patent law
doctrine of a different color. While the Federal Circuit may have always
considered the fate of Section 101 to be an academic inquiry, district
courts saw its promise as the straightest line to a final judgment.
32
Under the jurisdictional view, Section 101 could play a valuable
gate-keeping function, and in such fashion, its early application could in
fact be more pragmatic than the so-called "pragmatic" view espoused by
functionalists; namely, that Section 101 should be left for consideration
only after more narrowly-tailored and better-defined invalidity doctrines
have been considered.33 The post-Bilski, pre-Alice district court case law
applying Section 101 at early stages of patent cases suggested that early
case evaluation of Section 101 could produce dispositive results without
the need for the court and the parties to spend time and money on
extensive discovery, claim construction, and summary judgment
practice. Such results served the interests of justice and efficiency and
suggested that Section 101 need not present the feared "morass" at the
(2010) ("Rather than try to cut through the complexity of Bilski, or predict how it will be applied,
we talk about how to avoid it.").
28. See David Swetnam-Burland & Stacy 0. Stitham, Patent Law 101: The Threshold Test as
Threshing Machine, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 135, 136 (2013).
29. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1264 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see DealerTrack,
674 F.3d at 1330 n.3 (Linn, J.).
30. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602.
31. See Swetnam-Burland & Stitham, supra note 28, at 136.
32. See, e.g., Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance of Can., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1054
(E.D. Mo. 2011) (granting summary judgment on grounds that the asserted claims flunked the Bilski
test, declining to table consideration of the Section 101 arguments until after claim construction, and
noting that there "is no requirement that claims construction be completed before examining
patentability"); Graff/Ross Holdings LLP v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 07-796 (RJL)(AK),
2010 WL 6274263 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2010) (treating motion to dismiss on Section 101 grounds as a
motion for summary judgment, but finding that defendant had met burden to show that the asserted
claims attempted to patent an abstract idea); Glory Licensing LLC v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., No. 09-
4252 (FSH), 2011 WL 1870591 (D.N.J. May 16, 2011) (granting a motion to dismiss on grounds
that the asserted patents claimed abstract ideas and were not patentable under Section 101).
33. Swetnam-Burland & Stitham, supra note 28, at 147.
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district court level.
Nonetheless, until the test articulated by Mayo and Alice, the gate-
keeping potential of Section 101 was likely to remain more promise than
practice: without a clear doctrine of subject-matter eligibility, in the vast
majority of cases it would seem safer and more straightforward to go
through the exercise of claim construction and apply the narrower
doctrines of invalidity. This result would be unfortunate to the extent
that it overlooked the unique role of and opportunity presented by
Section 101. Patents that claim nothing more than a law of nature or an
abstract idea, however novel, risk the "danger that the grant of patents
that tie up their use will inhibit future invention premised upon them."
34
"The other tools of validity-anticipation, obviousness, written
description, or indefiniteness-do not address this concern and were not
intended to do so." 35 Moreover, "Section 101 is vital in addressing the
proliferation of subclasses of patents that have a common defect of
patentability, but may not share any of the defects covered by the other
doctrines of validity." 36 It is hardly efficient or effective to eliminate
such patents one by one on the narrowest possible grounds.
In examining the post-Bilski debate, we observed:
As patents compound the cost of doing business and the cost of patent
litigation continues to rise above the value of many patented
inventions, the difficult work of defining the scope of patent eligibility
becomes increasingly vital. Whether that scope is conceived more or
less broadly, inventors, patent examiners, litigants, lawyers, and
district judges need ongoing guidance on how to conceive those
boundaries so that they may value their patents, evaluate patent
applications, make business decisions regarding licensing, advise their
clients on whether to sue or settle, and decide cases.37
In Mayo and Alice, the Supreme Court provided that ongoing guidance.
IV. FOLLOWING ALICE DoWN THE RABBIT HOLE
Now that the Supreme Court has plunked for the jurisdictional view
of Section 101 in Mayo and again in Alice, have the results matched the
expectations? By and large, it has. Subject matter-ineligible patents are
being identified and eliminated through early case motion practice.
34. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (U.S. 2012).
35. Swetnam-Burland & Stitham, supra note 28, at 151.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 151-52.
2015]
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As of the date of writing, we are aware of twenty-six post-Alice
decisions that have applied the two-part Section 101 test, which are
listed below.
1. buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (affirming judgment of invalidity on the pleadings);
2. Digitech Image Technologies, LLC v. Electronics for
Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming
summary judgment of invalidity);
3. Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS, LLC, 576 F. App'x 1005 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (affirming summary judgment of invalidity);
4. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (affirming motion to dismiss);
5. DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 33 F.
Supp. 3d 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (granting motion for
summary judgment);
6. Comcast IP Holdings I, LLC v. Sprint Communications Co.
L.P., No. 12-205-RGA, 2014 WL 3542055 (D. Del. July
16, 2014) (granting motion for partial summary judgment);
7. Data Distribution Technologies, LLC v. BRER Affiliates,
Inc., No. 12-4878 (JBS/KMW), 2014 WL 4162765 (D.N.J.
Aug. 19, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss without
prejudice);
8. CMG Financial Services , Inc. v. Pacific Trust Bank,
F.S.B., Co. CV 11-10344 PSG (MRWx), 2014 WL
4922349 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2014) (granting motion for
summary judgment);
9. Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Laboratory Corp. of America
Holdings, No. 12-1736-LPS-CJB, 2014 WL 4379587 (D.
Del. Sept. 3, 2014) (report and recommendation that the
court grant motion to dismiss);
10. Walker Digital, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 1l-318-LPS,
2014 WL 4365245 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014) (granting motion
for summary judgment);
11. Loyalty Conversion Systems Corporation v.American
Airlines, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-655, 2014 WL 4364848 (E.D.
Tex. Sept. 3, 2014) (granting motion for judgment on the
pleadings);
12. TuxisTechnologies, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 13-
1771-RGA, 2014 WL 4382446 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014)
(granting motion to dismiss);
13. Eclipse IP LLC v. McKinley Equipment Corporation, No.
8
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SACV 14-742-GW (AJWx), 2014 WL 4407592 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 4, 2014) (granting motion to dismiss);
14. Autoform Engineering GMBH v. Engineering Technology
Associates, Inc., No. 10-14141, 2014 WL 4385855 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 5, 2014 (denying cross-motions for summary
judgment);
15. Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.
8:1I-cv-2826-T-23TBM, 2014 WL 4540319 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 11, 2014) (granting motion for summary judgment);
16. Helios Software, LLC v. SpectorSoft Corporation, No. 12-
081-LPS, 2014 WL 4796111 (D. Del. Sept. 18, 2014)
(denying motion for partial summary judgment);
17. Open Text S.A. v. Alfresco Software Ltd., No. 13-cv-04843-
JD, 2014 WL 4684429 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2014) (granting
motion to dismiss);
18. McRO, Inc., d.b.a. Planet Blue v. Sega of America, Inc.,
No. CV 12-10327-GW (FFMx), 2014 WL 4749601 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) (granting motion for judgment on the
pleadings in multiple consolidated cases);
19. Card Verification Solutions, LLC v. Citigroup Inc., No. 13-
C-6339, 2014 WL 4922524 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014)
(denying motion to dismiss);
20. Cogent Medicine, Inc. v. Physicians Interactive Holdings,
Inc., Nos. C-13-4479-RMW, C-13-4483, C-13-4486, 2014
WL 4966326 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014) (granting motion
to dismiss);
21. DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.,
No. 2:12-cv-00764-WCB-RSP, 2014 WL 4961992 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 3, 2014) (granting motion for summary
judgment);
22. AmDocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., No.l:10cv-
910, 2014 WL 5430956 (E.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2014) (granting
motion for judgment on the pleadings);
23. Wolf v. Capstone Photography, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-09573,
2014 WL 7639820 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) (granting
motion for judgment on the pleadings);
24. Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
Nos. 12-394-LPS, 12-396-LPS, 2014 WL 5507637 (D. Del.
Oct. 30, 2014) (granting motion to dismiss);
25. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:12-CV-7360-MRP-
MRW, 2014 WL 5661456 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014)
2015]
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(granting motion for summary judgment);
26. Ameranth, Inc. v. Genesis Gaming Solutions, Inc., Nos.
SACV 11-00189, SACV 13-00720 AG (RNBx), 2014 WL
7012391 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014) (denying motion for
summary judgment).
In the four cases it has decided, the Federal Circuit has affirmed
rulings below that asserted patents were not subject-matter eligible. Two
of these affirmances were from judgments rendered on the pleadings,
one from a motion to dismiss, and one from a motion for judgment on
the pleadings. Of the twenty-two district court cases, seventeen
determined that asserted patents were not subject-matter eligible. Ten of
those determinations were made on the pleadings, either on a motion to
dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The claimed abstract ideas held to be subject-matter ineligible
include:
" A "transaction performance guaranty";
38
" "[A]n ineligible abstract process of gathering and
combining data;
39
" "[M]anaging a bingo game while allowing a player to
repeatedly play the same sets of numbers in multiple
sessions,
4°
* Computerized meal-planning;
41
" Receiving a request and determining whether the request
requires a user prompt;
42
• Paying down a mortgage early when funds are available
and borrowing funds as needed to reduce the overall
interest charged;
43
" "[C]ontrolled exchange of information about people as
historically practiced by matchmakers and headhunters";
44
38. buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
39. Digitech Image Techs. LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
40. Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App'x 1005, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
41. DietGoal Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 33 F. Supp. 3d 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y.
2014).
42. Comcast IP Holdings 1, LLC, v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., No. 12-205-RGA, 2014 WL
3542055, at *3 (D. Del. July 16, 2014).
43. CMG Fin. Servs. v. Pac. Trust Bank, F.S.B., No. CV 11-10344 PSG(MRWx), 2014 WL
4922349, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2014).
44. Walker Digital, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 11-318-LPS, 2014 WL 4365245, at *5 (D. Del.
Sept. 3, 2014).
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* Computer-implemented upselling;
45
* "[A]sking someone whether they want to perform a task,
and if they do, waiting for them to complete it, and if they
do not, asking someone else";46
* "[R]egularly and frequently capturing a small and
inconspicuous quantity and segregating and retaining the
captured quantities until the quantities accumulate into a
large quantity";
47
* "[A] very simple computer-driven method to engage in the
commonplace and time-honored practice of interacting with
customers to promote marketing and sales";48 and
* "[T]he abstract idea of maintaining and searching a library
of information.
49
Certain recurring principles or themes are beginning to emerge
from these cases. First, the rule excluding laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from patent-eligibility is a bright-line rule
that has no exceptions.50 The rule applies to abstract ideas without regard
to how broadly or narrowly they are defined.5'
Second, the analysis focuses on the claims, not the specification. If
the specification describes a concrete and tangible application of an
abstract idea, but the claims do not, the specification cannot save the
claims.52
Third, considering whether a human being with pencil and paper
could perform the functions claimed in the patent is a useful judicial
45. Tuxis Techs., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 13-1771-RGA, 2014 WL 4382446, at *3
(D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014).
46. Eclipse IP LLC v. McKinley Equip. Corp., No. SACV 14-742-GW(AJWx), 2014 WL
4407592, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014).
47. Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 8:1 1-cv-2826-T-23TBM, 2014
WL 4540319, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2014).
48. Open Text S.A. v. Alfresco Software Ltd, No. 13-cv-04843-JD, 2014 WL 4684429, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2014).
49. Cogent Med., Inc. v. Elsevier Inc., Nos. C-13-4479-RMW, C-13-4483, C-13-4486, 2014
WL 4966326, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014).
50. buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (U.S. 2012)).
51. See id. at 1352 ("[T]he Court has ruled that the exclusion applies if a claim involves a
natural law or phenomenon or abstract idea, even if the particular natural law or phenomenon or
abstract idea at issue is narrow.").
52. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (U.S. 2014) ("[W]e
consider the elements of each claim both individually and as an ordered combination to determine
whether the additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible
application.") (internal quotation omitted).
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heuristic.53
Fourth, the mere speed and efficiency of a computer cannot render
an abstract idea concrete.4 Rather, a computer must do something more
than speed up an abstract process to create eligible subject matter for a
claim.
Further, the district courts are starting to wrestle with the
relationship between the Alice test and other patent law doctrines, such
as novelty or the significance of the prior art. The Federal Circuit, for
example, has made plain that a novel idea may nonetheless be abstract.
"We do not agree... that the addition of merely novel or non-routine
components to the claimed idea necessarily turns an abstraction into
something concrete. In any event, any novelty in implementation of the
idea is a factor to be considered only in the second step of the Alice
analysis. ,
55
And prior art cited in the specification may be used to determine
whether the claim language asserts an inventive concept or an idea
56already acknowledged in the field. In McRO, the prior art cited in the
specification demonstrated that the only element of the claimed
invention not disclosed in the prior art was the use of rules.57 Because
the claims purported to cover any and all rules that might be used to
automate a process long-known in the art, the actual invention was,
despite the appearance of concreteness and tangibility in the claim
language, an ineligible abstract idea.58
53. See Loyalty Conversion Sys. Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-655, 2014 WL
4364848, at * 10 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2014) ("As confirmation of the simplicity of the functions that
the claims assign to computers, it is clear that each of the functions recited in the asserted claims...
could be performed by a human being without the aid of a computer of any kind."); Tuxis Techs.,
LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 13-1771-RGA, 2014 WL 4382446, at *5 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014) ("A
human being can generate an upsell recommendation 'during the course of the user initiated
communication,' although not perhaps with the efficiency or speed of a computer."); Eclipse IP
LLC v. McKinley Equip. Corp., No. SACV 14-742-GW(AJWx), 2014 WL 4407592, at *6 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 4, 2014). ("McKinley correctly points out that all of the recited steps of claim 1 can be
performed by a person talking on the phone."); Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App'x
1005, 1007 (C.D. Cal.2014).
54. See Tuxis Techs., 2014 WL 4382446 at *5 (quoting Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012); and DealerTrack, Inc. v.
Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (increased speed or efficiency of computer-
implementation not sufficient to confer patent eligibility).
55. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
56. See McRO, Inc., d.b.a. Planet Blue v. Sega of Am., Inc., No. CV 12-10327-GW (FFMx),
2014 WL 474960, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) ("However, for purposes of the § 101 analysis, it
is not enough to view the claims in isolation. Instead, when determining whether a patent contains
an adequate inventive concept, the Court must factor out conventional activity.").
57. Seeid.at*10-11.
58. See id. at *11 (citing Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (U.S.
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In his summary judgment order in Loyalty Conversion, Federal
Circuit Judge William C. Bryson, sitting by designation, has provided
perhaps the clearest statement to date of the features common to subject
matter-ineligible claims to abstract ideas:
(1) they recite methods for performing a commonplace business
function-such as currency conversion, hedging, or employing
intermediated settlement in a financial transaction-typically by using
a computer system or computer components to perform those methods;
(2) they are aspirational in nature in that they describe the business
function, but do not describe any novel manner of performing that
function other than referring to the use of routine operations performed
by a specially program[m]ed computer; and (3) the recitations referring
to the use of a computer do not include any inventive measure that
"purport[s] to improve the functioning of the computer itself....
In short, such patents, although frequently dressed up in the argot of
invention, simply describe a problem, announce purely functional steps
that purport to solve the problem, and recite standard computer opera-
tions to perform some of the steps. The principal flaw in these patents
is that they do not contain an "inventive concept" that solves practical
problems and ensures that the patent is directed to something "signifi-
cantly more than" the ineligible abstract idea itself. 
59
In sum, this case law shows the Federal Circuit and the district
courts doing their basic judicial work, applying the two-step Alice test to
patents at the motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the pleadings,
or summary judgment stages; doing so conscientiously and
deliberatively; and reaching decisions that penetrate the often murky
language in which patent claims are drafted to reveal the "inventive
concept" within. Whether one agrees with the policy underlying the
jurisdictional view of Section 101 or not, the evidence to date suggests
that this policy can be and is being implemented effectively and
efficiently, allowing for some cases to be resolved at the pleadings stage.
IV. THE IDEA BEHIND THE CURTAIN
We close with a discussion of the most recent case to be decided by
the Federal Circuit under Alice as of the time of writing, which has the
paradoxical distinction of also being one of the earliest post-Bilski cases
2014), quoting Mayo Collaborative Sen's. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (U.S.
2012)).
59. Loyalty Conversion Sys. Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-655, 2014 WL
4364848, at *13 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2014) (citations omitted).
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to put the question of Section 101 plainly before the Federal Circuit and
the Supreme Court: Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC.60 Ultramercial
encapsulates both the tensions between the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court over Section 101, and the resolution of those tensions by
Alice. As such, the outcome of Ultramercial provides some measure of
closure while, at the same time, presaging future battles within the
Federal Circuit that may require Supreme Court intervention.
On August 13, 2010, two months after Bilski, Judge R. Gary
Klausner of the Central District of California granted a defense motion
to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a claim. Judge
Klausner ruled that the plaintiffs patent to a method for allowing
Internet users to view copyrighted material free of charge in exchange
for watching certain advertisements was subject-matter ineligible under
Section 101.61
On September 15, 2011, in an opinion written by then-Chief Judge
Randall R. Rader, the Federal Circuit reversed.62 In so concluding, Judge
Rader wrote, "[S]ubject matter eligibility is merely a threshold check;
claim patentability ultimately depends on 'the conditions and
requirements of this title,' such as novelty, obviousness, and adequate
disclosure. 35 U.S.C. § 101.,,63 Section 101 was, in Judge Rader's view,
a "coarse eligibility filter."'
64
On May 21, 2012, the Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Federal
Circuit for reconsideration in light of Mayo.
65
On June 21, 2013, the Federal Circuit, in another opinion written by
Judge Rader, reversed again.66 In this opinion, Judge Rader expressed
the view that "it will be rare that a patent infringement suit can be
dismissed at the pleading stage for lack of patentable subject matter.
This is so because every issued patent is presumed to have been issued
properly, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.67
On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court granted a second petition for
writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the
60. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d 709.
61. See Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, No. CV 09-06918 RGK (PLAx), 2010 WL
3360098 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010).
62. See Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
63. Id. at 1326 (citation omitted).
64. Id. (quotation omitted).
65. See Wildtangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (U.S. 2012).
66. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
67. Id. at 1338 (citations omitted).
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Federal Circuit for reconsideration in light of Alice.68
On November 14, 2014, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of the motion to dismiss, finding that "the added benefit of
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Alice" tipped the balance in favor of
the judgment that the claims were subject-matter ineligible.69 Under
Alice, the analysis of the subject-matter eligibility of the asserted patent
on the pleadings proved abecedarian.70 That is to say, application of the
two-part Alice test made it possible for the Federal Circuit to affirm the
early case decision of Judge Klausner that the asserted patent claimed an
abstract idea.
In this most recent chapter of the Ultramercial saga, not only did
the appellate outcome change, but also the composition of the panel,
with Judge Haldane R. Mayer replacing the retired Chief Judge Rader.
And that change offered Judge Mayer the opportunity to pen a
concurrence that cogently sets out issues decided and raised by Alice (in
his view and ours). First, Judge Mayer offers his endorsement of the
jurisdictional view of Section 101.71 Section 101 "is the primal inquiry,
one that must be addressed at the outset of litigation., 72 The legal
requirement that district courts conduct the Section 101 inquiry first has,
in turn, practical benefits: it conserves judicial resources because it
frames an issue that can be decided on the pleadings; it presents a
"bulwark against vexatious infringement suits"; and it protects the public
by serving as "the most efficient and effective tool for clearing the patent
thicket, weeding out those patents that stifle innovation and transgress
the public domain.,
73
Second, Judge Mayer calls out the new elephant in the Section 101
room: the standard of proof for the trial court to apply in making the
Section 101 determination. While the Supreme Court has held that
patent invalidity must be decided by clear and convincing evidence
because of the presumption that an issued patent is valid,74 the Supreme
Court made clear in Mayo, and then in Alice, that Section 101 is a
different animal. As Judge Mayer notes, "[a]lthough the Supreme Court
has taken up several section 101 cases in recent years, it has never
68. See Wildtangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (U.S. 2014).
69. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 713 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
70. Seeid. at 715.
71. See id. at 718 ("In this sense, the section 101 determination bears some of the hallmarks
of a jurisdictional inquiry.").
72. Id.
73. Id. at 719.
74. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (U.S. 2011).
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mentioned-much less applied-any presumption of eligibility.
'" 75
Moreover, the rationale that underlies the presumption of validity does
not apply to the Section 101 issue "[b]ecause the P[atent and]
T[rademark] O[ffice] has for many years applied an insufficiently
rigorous subject matter eligibility standard ....
If Section 101 continues to prove efficient and effective at weeding
out bad patents early in litigation, it is only a (relatively short) matter of
time before this question will be posed to the Federal Circuit head-on,
then (possibly) to the Federal Circuit en banc, and then (possibly) to the
Supreme Court. Stay tuned. The wild ride of Section 101 may yet veer
off in a new direction. In the meantime, with Alice, the Supreme Court
has provided clear direction to district courts to take Section 101
seriously, apply it early, and check the bonafides of the man behind the
curtain.
75. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 720-21 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 720.
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